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AUSTIN OWEN LECTURE

REASSESSMENT SHOULD NOT LEAD TO WHOLESALE
REJECTION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The Honorable Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.*
The Honorable Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr., presented this
address as The Fifth Annual Austin Owen Lecture on September 26, 1996.
The Honorable Austin E. Owen attended Richmond College from 1946-47 and received his law degree from The
T.C. Williams School of Law in 1950. During his distinguished career, Judge Owen served as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; a partner in
Owen, Guy, Rhodes, Betz, Smith and Dickerson; and was
appointed Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit of Virginia
where he served until his retirement in 1990. The Law
School community grieved the loss of this distinguished
alumnus upon his death in March, 1995. In 1991, Judge
Owen's daughter, Dr. Judith 0. Hopkins, W'74, and son-inlaw, Dr. Marbry B. Hopkins, R'74, established the Austin
Owen Lecture which is held each fall at the Law School.

* Justice, Supreme Court of Virginia. Formerly Chief Judge, Court of Appeals of
Virginia, 1985-96; Judge, Virginia Circuit Court for the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit,
1976-85; Chief Judge, Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, 196876. B.S., 1962, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University;, LL.B., 1965, The

T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
For those of you who knew and respected him as I did, you will understand
when I say it is a great honor to have had this opportunity to deliver the Fifth An-

nual Austin Owen Lecture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While coming into the twenty-first century will be a new
experience for all of us, we should be conscious of the intersections of the past, present, and future as we near the year 2000.
Reassessment in many areas of our society seems not only
appropriate, but to be expected at such a time. Change becomes
inevitable, but I submit not all change is positive or justified.
In "taking stock" there seems to be an overwhelming desire on
the part of many to dissect and discard every social movement,
every technological advance, and every political theorem which
this century has produced. The pundits would have you believe
that every societal evil is not the fault of current policy, but
rather the inevitable result of some long chain of events begun
twenty, fifty, or one hundred years ago.
I take, as an example, the present movement to reform, and
in some instances relegate to the scrap heap, the single most
significant innovation in the American system of justice in this
century, the creation and universal implementation of a juvenile justice system. A system having separate courts, separate
procedures, and most significantly, separate goals for the corrective measures it imposed upon the existing criminal justice
system.
In very general terms these "reforms" are aimed at treating
juvenile offenders more like adult offenders. For example, some
of the more common proposals are: (1) the elimination of confidentiality of juvenile records; (2) the imposition of equal sentences for adults and juveniles charged with the same kind of
crime; (3) the elimination of juvenile court jurisdiction for specific offenses; (4) the lowering of the maximum age for juvenile
court jurisdiction; (5) the raising of the maximum age for which
a juvenile may be kept in a juvenile institution and the use of
adult institutions for sentencing; and (6) the transfer of authority to waive jurisdiction from the juvenile court judges to
the State's attorney.
Some have suggested that these reforms represent no more
than a swing in the pendulum of public opinion undoubtedly
fostered by the mass media's exposure of the whole topic of
juvenile delinquency and sensational reporting of particularly
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violent crimes involving juveniles. To some extent this may well
be true. History reveals that in this area the pendulum of public opinion is an apt analogy, but the danger in periodic assessment is that rejection can be an all too appealing "quick fix." I
submit that the quick fix is all the more appealing because it
permits one to ignore the inherent difficulty in the reassessment process of a judicial system, not really understood by
many, nor lending itself well to statistical analysis.
In these brief comments, allow me to paint with an admittedly broad brush. What began as a social experiment imposed
within a court system, evolved into a delicate and complicated
menu of cause and effect. I will begin by framing the term
"juvenile delinquency" and then discuss the historical judicial
response to it.

II. CONCEPTUALIZING "JUVENILE DELINQUENCY"
Consider this quote:
The young are in character prone to desire and ready to
carry any desire they may have formed into action. Their
wishes are keen without being permanent; like a sick man's
fits of hunger and thirst. They are passionate, irascible and
apt to be carried away by their impulses. If the young commit a fault, it is always on the side of excess for they carry
everything too far whether it be their love or hatred or
anything else.'
Thoughts of a modern sociologist or behavioral scientist? No,
the thoughts of Aristotle who suggests youthful conduct or
misbehaviors appear to be causally connected to their stage of
development. We know from the common law that children
under seven years of age were assumed to be incapable of criminal intent and, thus, unable to commit actions regarded as
crimes.' From age seven to age fourteen, children were also

1.

F.

THORNTON, JR. & LYDIA VOIGHT, DELINQUENCY AND INJUSTICE 4
HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCAWIlLIAm

(3d ed. 1992) (quoting G.S.

TION (1905)).
2. See Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858); Clay v. State, 196 So. 462 (Fla.
1940); 4 WILLIAI BLACKSTONE, COMIENTARIES *23-24; Frederick Woodbridge, Physical
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presumed innocent of criminal intent unless it could be proved
that they possessed the knowledge of right and wrong. 3 Thereafter, children fourteen and older were held accountable for
their crimes and receive adult punishment.4
Over the years, while recognizing that age was a significant
factor in youthful behavior, our search for causation has added
many other factors. Poverty, dysfunctional families, learning
disabilities, maternal smoking, toxic metal exposure, poor nutrition and mutant genes are but a few. The truth is that since
Aristotle's time we do not know why some juveniles become
delinquent and others do not. Thus, there is no universal agreement on a comprehensive definition of the term "juvenile delinquency."
With this unsettling state of affairs, enters the judicial response. Over several hundred years the judiciary attempted to

respond to a problem it could not define nor understand.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO DELINQUENCY

A. Early Treatment of Juvenile "Offenders"
Imagine that you are an orphaned or abandoned child in
colonial Virginia. Under the Poor Laws enacted in the colony in
1646, 5 your only recourse as a ward of the state is indenture in
an apprenticeship selected for you. Owing absolute obedience to
your master, you run the risk of swift and severe corporal punishment imposed by a local tribunal for any slight infraction of
that duty. That same tribunal is charged with overseeing the
actions of masters and punishing abuse of apprentices, but in
all likelihood the tribunal consists of other masters and wealthy
landowners whose sympathies are not likely to rest with you.

and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 426, 426-35 (1939).
3. See McCormack v. State, 15 So. 438, 440 (Ala. 1894); Martin v. State, 8 So.
858, 860-61 (Ala. 1891); WAYNE LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scow, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §
4.11 (1972).
4. See Godfrey, 31 Ala. at 327-28; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 23-

24.
5.

1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE, Act XXVII (1646).
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Imagine that you are a child living in an immigrant tenement of an East Coast city in the mid-nineteenth century. To
society at-large, you are a part of "the dangerous classes;"6 and7
while the efforts of many, who call themselves "child savers,"
are well-meant, the realty of the House of Refuge they founded
for your benefit is far from beneficial. These institutions were
little more than workhouses where the residents, some would
say inmates, performed piecework for local factories.'
B. Developing the Doctrine of Parens Patriae
It was to the Philadelphia House of Refuge that a twelveyear-old girl was taken in the 1830s on a charge of vagrancy.
Crouse was her surname, but her given name is lost in time.
Her father, by writ of habeas corpus, sought her release. The
superior court rejected his effort, finding that where natural
parents are "unequal to the task, or unworthy of it, [they
should] be superseded by the parens patriae" to safeguard the
community.9 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed, and
with those two words, parens patriae, it gave to the state the
power to take a twelve-year-old girl from her parents, without
due process of law, for the crime of being poor.'0
It would be thirty-two years before the Illinois Supreme
Court would render a contrary opinion." We may presume
that Daniel O'Connell of the city of Chicago was not a model
citizen. Indeed, it is likely that he committed a few petty
crimes in the slum near the slaughterhouses where he lived,
but his arrest and incarceration in the Chicago Reform School
was not predicated on any crime of property or violence. Rath-

6. See J. Herbie DiFonzo, Deprived of 'Fatal Liberty': The Rhetoric of Child
Saving and the Reality of Juvenile Incarceration, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 855, 855 n.1
(1995).
7. See Murray Levine, A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of Mandated Reporting of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711,
715 (1993); Brian R. Suffredini, Note, Juvenile Gunslingers: A Place for Punitive Philosophy in Rehabilitative Juvenile Justice, 35 B.C. L. REV. 885, 889 (1994).
S. See ANTHONY M. PRATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 69 (1977) (stating that at the
Illinois State Reformatory, "inmates were forced to work ten hours a day manufacturing shoes, brushes, and chairs."); DiFonzo, supra note 6, at 882-83.
9. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839) (per curiam).
10. See id.
11. See People ex rel O'Connell v. Turner, 55 ]M. 280 (1870).
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er, it was on a determination that he was a destitute youth
without proper supervision. Daniel's parents challenged their
son's arrest, and the Illinois Supreme Court returned him to
their custody, finding that Daniel's arrest for simple "misfortune,"2 rather than a criminal act, was violative of due process.

It is uncommon for a single decision of an appellate court to
have immediate effect beyond the parties at issue, but
O'Connell was an uncommon case. Within two years the Chicago Reform School was forced to close. Every Illinois statute
which allowed misfortune, rather than criminal acts, to result
in the confining of children to an institution was challenged
and defeated. While many states continued to adhere to a strict
interpretation of parens patriae," others followed Illinois' lead,
and that left a vacuum.'4
C. Legislative Reaction to the Void
Reform of an unjust system does not always result in a just
one. By recognizing the inequity of a system that tore families
apart and treated children as less than full citizens, the Illinois
Supreme Court helped to overcome a great injustice, but in so
doing, it also removed an effective tool for controlling delinquency and criminal activity. Many who had clamored for reform in the treatment of children in our justice system, were
appalled when that reform led to treatment of youthful offenders as adults. If due process was to be afforded, the only process that was available was the criminal court.
Illinois again led the way, perhaps because it had the greatest need, having started the ball rolling, when in 1899 it enacted the Juvenile Court Act.' This landmark legislation repre12. See id at 287-88.
13. See, e.g., Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203 (1886); Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197 (1881); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48 (1905).
14. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885) (holding that a
statute which authorized a justice of the peace to commit a minor under the age of
seventeen without a trial, on a criminal charge of which the justice of the peace had
no jurisdiction, was unconstitutional as it violated due process).
15. Act of Apr. 21, 1899, §§ 1-21, 1899 IlM. Laws 131. For a thorough discussion
of the Act, see also Birt E. Waite, The Origin and Development of the Juvenile
Court, 109-12 (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee).
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sents the first real innovation in the treatment of children by
the American justice system. All prior actions, both by the state
and private institutions, merely expedited existing policies,
admittedly with benevolent intent, but nonetheless sought
merely to control a segment of society viewed as dangerous and
unworthy of better treatment. By contrast, the Juvenile Court
Act had as its paramount goal the best interests of the child. 6
Justice Fortas, recounting the history of juvenile justice in the
1967 case In re Gault,'7 viewed the reform this way:
The child--essentially good, as [the reformer] saw it-was
to be made "to feel that he was the object of [the state's]
care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or under

The idea of crime and punishment was to be
trial ....
abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be "clinical" rather than punitive."
This may not seem particularly innovative. Indeed it must
seem to us as second nature, but it was a radical idea at the
beginning of this century. It was an idea whose time had apparently come, however, for by 1919 every state but two had
enacted similar legislation.' 9
Remarkably, the Juvenile Court Act is not uncharacteristic of
our modern understanding of juvenile justice. The drafters
made careful distinctions between status offenses, criminal acts,
and children neglected or in need of supervision." Separate
courts, separate procedures, and separate institutional programs
were all hallmarks of the Act, just as they are today in our
juvenile courts.

16. See Act of Apr. 21, 1899, § 21, 1899 Ill. Laws 131, 137 ('This act shall be
liberally construed to the end that its purpose may be carried out, to-.wit: That the
care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that
which should be given by its parents."); see also, Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court,
23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).

17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. Id. at 15-16.
19. Only Maine and Wyoming remained without reform.
20. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 21, 1899, § 7 (defining dependent and neglected children); § 9 (regarding the disposition of delinquent children and distinguishing between status offenses and criminal acts).
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The justification for -these reforms was again parens patriae,
but it was a paternalism of the state tempered by lessons of
the past. If the procedures afforded the children did not reach
the full panoply of constitutional protections, nonetheless there
were procedures, defined and required to be followed, which
afforded basic protection.
Until the conclusion of the Second World War, there was
little further innovation in the juvenile justice system. It must
be conceded that many of the ideals first put forth in 1899
remained unrealized. In many instances, the warehousing of
youths from the lower classes continued much as it had been in
the days of the Houses of Refuge.
In the 1950s, many began to reject the rehabilitation model
and question whether a paternalistic system could effectively
address the problems of delinquency and neglect, judging the
whole concept a failure. It would be fairer to say that the philosophy underlying parens patriae did not fail, but that it accomplished only what it could.
D. Extending ConstitutionalProtections
At the same time, the juvenile justice system was under attack by public opinion. For its alleged lack of results, both the
juvenile and adult criminal justice systems came under reassessment in the United States Supreme Court. As a result, the
Court made sweeping changes in both systems.
With regard to adults, the Court decided in Mapp v. Ohio"'
that the familiar exclusionary rule applied to state court proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court further held in Escobedo v. Illinois22 that the Sixth Amendment's
right to an attorney, and in Miranda v. Arizona,' that the
Fifth Amendment's right not to self-incriminate were also applicable to state court proceedings. In this same period of sweeping change, the Court reassessed and restructured the informal
procedural requirements of the juvenile justice system that, for

21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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approximately sixty years, had been hidden from public and appellate judicial scrutiny.
As had been the case with David O'Connell in Chicago almost one-hundred years before, Morris Kent, a sixteen-year-old
in Washington, D.C., in 1966, was not a model citizen. The
charges against him of statutory burglary, robbery and rape
were entirely inconsistent with even the benevolent view Aristotle suggested about youthful conduct. Under the circumstances it should not be surprising to us that Kent was transferred
to the adult system for trial without a transfer hearing and in
spite of Kent's assertions that only the juvenile system could
adequately treat his physiological problems.' It is equally not
surprising that, in response, the Supreme Court struck down
the transfer as lacking in constitutional due process, long understood as applicable to adults.' Certainly, following Kent the
legal and academic communities began to reassess the juvenile
justice system.
In 1967, the Court considered the case of Gerald Gault, a
fifteen-year-old from Arizona, who was sent to reform school for
making an obscene phone call to a woman neighbor.2 6 Gault
had been in trouble before and the judge knew it. Consequently, the judge sent Gault to a reform school without a hearing. 7 As a result, the Supreme Court imposed upon the juvenile justice system the right to notice of the charges, right to
an attorney, right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and right to a fair trial.'
Three years later with Samuel Winship, a twelve-year-old
New York purse snatcher, the Court imposed proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the adult standard, as the standard of proof
required in the juvenile court for conviction of criminal acts.29
A year later, a sixteen-year-old from Pennsylvania charged
with robbery, failed in his attempt to insist upon the right to a
jury trial in the juvenile cburt." Perhaps with the McKeiver3 l
24. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 545-52 (1966).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 560-64.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
id. at 6-10.
id. at 31-57.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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the pendulum ceased its swing toward the elimination of essential procedural distinctions between the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems. How should these differences in the definition and treatment of juvenile offenders affect our present discussion?
IV. JUVENILE OFFENDERS: NOT A YOUTHFUL VERSION OF THE
ADULT CRIMINAL

No one denies the wisdom of the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in extending constitutional protections to youthful offenders. No one desires a return to the House of Refuge mentality.
But, it is impossible to deny that the extension of adult process
to the juvenile system has contributed further to the perception,
at least, that it is merely a mirror image of the adult criminal
justice system affording lesser punishment for criminal acts
merely because of the age of the offender.
That perception, born of fear and understandable frustration,
has steadily eroded support for the nobler aspirations of the
juvenile justice system. The danger is that as support erodes,
those fears become self-fulfilling prophecies, and those frustrations become political ideology.
Today, we are at a crossroads in the administration of juvenile justice. Reassessment of that system is the order of the day
from almost every corner of our society. There are those who
would urge us to take the path that would discard in its totality one hundred years of progress. They would treat juvenile
criminals as adult criminals; trying them in adult court and
placing them in adult prisons. Status offenses would be
criminalized too, though not for the offenders. Rather, the parents would now be judged guilty and punished for failing to
meet the expectations of society. In short, the arguments suggest that we could eliminate juvenile delinquency by simply
redefining it. This, despite the fact that juvenile delinquency
has for hundreds of years defied definition.

31. See Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634; see also John D. Goetz, Note,
Children's Rights Under the Burger Court: Concern for the Child but Deference to
Authority, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1214, 1215-16 (1985).
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It is not my intention to chastise. I recognize that the single
issue of juvenile justice cannot be viewed outside the context of
other social problems. Poverty, absentee parents, drug abuse,
and a host of other social ills are part of the challenge that
faces our judicial system and our society as a whole. I also
recognize that severe youthful offenders may require punishment for serious offenses similar to the adult system. My point
simply is this: the inability of the juvenile justice system, or of
the criminal justice system, to be a panacea for the evils it sets
out to address is not a justification for abandoning or even
lessening the effort.
Sam, as I will call him, did not like school, but made good
grades. Aristotle would have described him as impulsive and
prone to carry anything too far. At age seventeen, in the eleventh grade of high school, he took without permission, (stole if
you will) his neighbor's car and drove from Roanoke to Florida
where he was arrested. Under all of the circumstances, and I
will spare you the details, the juvenile court at the time decided to retain him within the juvenile system rather than to
transfer him to the adult system.
Today, when I see Sam busily running his independent insurance agency I wonder what would have been his future if the
law at the time had mandated his waiver from the juvenile
court to the adult court. What impact would the "reforms" I
mentioned earlier, have had if applied to his case? Sam is an
example that the juvenile justice system can accomplish its
goals.
V.

CONCLUSION

Why do some juveniles become delinquent and others do not?
Where is the line to be drawn between youthful impulse and
criminal acts? The answers remain elusive. But, as we enter a
new century, we need not surrender our ideals to our fears. Nor
should we let our ideals blind us to the reality that spawns
those fears, but let constructive reassessment, rather than rejection, be our watchword. As informed members of the legal and
academic community, I trust that you will actively guard
against uninformed rejection of a system that promotes juvenile
justice.

